Collective action and market formation: An integrative framework by Lee, Brandon H. et al.
RE S EARCH ART I C L E
Collective action and market formation: An
integrative framework
Brandon H. Lee1 | Jeroen Struben2 | Christopher B. Bingham3
1Melbourne Business School, University of
Melbourne, Carlton, Australia
2Emlyon Business School, Écully, France
3Kenan-Flagler Business School, The University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill,
North Carolina
Correspondence
Brandon H. Lee, Melbourne Business School,
University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester Street,
Carlton, VIC 3053, Australia.
Email: b.lee@mbs.edu
Research Summary: While extant research recognizes
the importance of collective action for market formation,
it provides little understanding about when and to what
extent collective action is important. In this article, we
develop a novel theoretical framework detailing what col-
lective action problems and solutions arise in market for-
mation and under what conditions. Our framework
centers on the development of market infrastructure with
three key factors that influence the nature and extent of
collective action problems: perceived returns to contribu-
tions, excludability, and contribution substitutability. We
apply our framework to diverse market formation con-
texts and derive a set of attendant propositions. Finally,
we show how collective action problems and solutions
evolve during market formation efforts and discuss how
our framework contributes to strategic management,
entrepreneurship, and organization literatures.
Managerial Summary: This article lays out the key con-
siderations that players operating in new markets should
contemplate when making nontrivial investments in those
spaces. As collective action problems can thwart efforts
to establish new markets, we ask: When and under what
conditions should market players collaborate rather than
act independently? And if players collaborate, how
should they coordinate to establish a new market? To
address these research questions, we develop a novel gen-
eralizable framework of collective action in market for-
mation. Our framework assesses the presence and type of
collective action problems that hinder market formation
and identifies potential solutions tied to those collective
action problems.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long advanced theories regarding the creation of new markets (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994;
Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000) and sought to empirically identify the mechanisms and processes asso-
ciated with market origins and trajectories (Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009; Lounsbury, Ventresca, &
Hirsch, 2003; Ozcan & Santos, 2015; Sine & Lee, 2009). Much of this work is based on the premise
that collective action is central to market formation, and that such efforts often resemble social
movements (G. F. Davis & McAdam, 2000; Fligstein, 2001; Rao et al., 2000). Studies emphasize
the collective nature of market elements such as the promotion of new cognitive frames (Benner &
Tripsas, 2012; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015), the solidification of identities and categories (Lee, Hiatt, &
Lounsbury, 2017; Kennedy, 2008; Navis & Glynn, 2010), the use of mobilization structures (Hiatt
et al., 2009; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008), the creation of supportive regulation (Lee, 2009;
Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001), and the achievement of legitimacy (Pacheco, York, & Hargrave,
2014; Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005). This work indicates that market formation often requires
the creation of a shared market infrastructure—material and sociocognitive elements supporting the
functioning of a stable market (Van de Ven, 1993)—that benefits market actors (albeit differen-
tially). Achieving this market infrastructure generally requires efforts that supersede those possible
by any single actor (Ozcan & Santos, 2015). That is, collective action across distinct actors is often
necessary to construct new markets and to redirect resources from existing uses in established mar-
kets (Rao et al., 2000; Van de Ven & Garud, 1993). We conceptualize collective action situations as
those in which a group of actors have an interest in the construction of a collective good (in the case of
new markets, market infrastructure), which cannot easily or fully be withheld from others (Marwell &
Oliver, 1993, p. 4). Collective action is then any activity aimed at the provision of this collective good.
This notion of collective action is illustrated by the key challenges that actors faced in the early com-
mercialization of radio broadcasting, which centered on integrating novel technological components for
achieving, transmitting, and receiving radio signals (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991). Market
actors viewed these components as private property, protected by patents. However, because the devel-
opment, production, and use of these technologies were interdependent, creating actual value was con-
tingent on others’ contributions and willingness to cooperate.
Yet, while collective action is critical, it is often difficult to achieve because actors may not per-
ceive their own and others’ contributions as making a difference (Marwell & Oliver, 1993), may
have conflicting goals (Simcoe, 2012), may be unfamiliar with or untrusting of one another
(J. P. Davis, 2016), and/or may strategically withhold making contributions because they realize that
others may provide those instead (Olson, 1965).
While scholars recognize that collective action is central in market formation and takes a wide
range of forms, the extant literature faces two limitations. First, there are no clear boundary conditions
for when, what kind of, and to what extent collective action is important. Second, much of the litera-
ture assumes a shared rationale for collective action. For example, while not explicitly focused on mar-
ket creation, DiMaggio (1988) stated, “New institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient
resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value highly” (p. 14, emphasis
added). Such language implies that actors have shared interests, possess adequate resources, and are
already organized. In other words, extant literature assumes that collective action comes about natu-
rally because different actors all want the market to emerge. But this may not be the case. Resource-
constrained actors, for instance, may not understand what other actors will contribute to building the
market. Further, different actors may hold contrasting views and expectations regarding the market
and how they will participate in it. This tends to positively bias researchers toward ex-post
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explanations of market formation in which a shared basis for collective action is unproblematic. As a
result, questions regarding the nature and need for collective action in market formation remain unan-
swered. We focus on this gap. Specifically, we ask: What collective action problems tend to prevent
market formation, and under what conditions? And what are the solutions that actors pursue across
those respective situations?
To address these research questions, we develop a novel generalizable framework of collective
action in market formation. Our theoretical framework assesses the presence and type of collective
action problems that hinder market formation and identifies potential solutions tied to those collec-
tive action problems. We then draw upon the collective action literature (Hardin, 1968; Marwell &
Oliver, 1993; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990) to spotlight and synthesize key collective action pro-
cesses and dynamics relevant for market formation. The first two factors center on the perceived
returns of actor contributions to market infrastructure development (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007;
Marwell & Oliver, 1993) and the degree to which the benefits associated with those contributions
are excludable (Olson, 1965). In contrast to these canonical collective action factors, the building
of market infrastructure often necessitates distinct contributions from specific actors (Ansari &
Garud, 2009; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). That is, contributions from such actors may not be fully
substitutable. Hence, for the analysis of market formation contexts, we include as a third factor
the degree of contribution substitutability (Monge et al., 1998). After describing our framework,
we apply it to a range of market formation efforts1 to provide a better understanding of collective
action problems and solutions. Finally, we demonstrate how the framework can be used dynami-
cally to reveal how collective action problems and solutions associated with market formation
may evolve over time.
This article contributes in three ways. First, despite much work on market formation, little pro-
gress has been made in abstracting from specific markets to develop a general theory of market for-
mation (Fligstein, 2001). Providing an integrative framework that identifies when collective efforts
are most likely needed and when they are not prepares the way for a more comprehensive and pro-
grammatic study of market formation dynamics (Forbes & Kirsch, 2011). Second, we develop a
contingency approach to understanding the solutions to collective action problems in market crea-
tion. Our framework helps identify when market creation is more likely to be achieved by actors
working independently of one another versus when more formal coordination may be needed. Third,
the phenomenon of market formation has been explored by multiple scholars in diverse fields, but
to date, there has been little effort to integrate theories and findings across disciplinary boundaries
of organization, entrepreneurship, and strategy literatures. By establishing a framework for under
what conditions collective action is most likely needed for market formation, we provide a bridging
theory that will enable greater dialogue across distinct disciplinary boundaries.
In the next section, we provide the theoretical grounding for our approach. We then introduce
the collective action framework and detail the drivers of collective action problems inherent in dis-
tinct forms of market formation. Next, we use this framework to analyze a range of market forma-
tion efforts and develop a typology to derive propositions regarding the nature of collective action
problems and solutions in market formation. Finally, we highlight the dynamic nature of market for-
mation efforts and conclude with a discussion of the research contributions.
1We choose to use the term “market formation efforts” rather than “nascent market” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009), “industry emer-
gence” (Grodal, Gotsopoulos, & Suarez, 2015), “industry incubation” (Moeen & Agarwal, 2017), “market emergence” (Ozcan & San-
tos, 2015), or “field formation” (Fligstein, 2001) because it emphasizes the actions that actors pursue regardless of whether such
efforts culminate in the successful formation of a market.
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2 | MARKET FORMATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
Markets are “social arenas that exist for the production and sale of some good or service… character-
ized by structured exchange” (Fligstein, 2001, p. 30). Structured exchange means that because mar-
ket actors desire repeated exchange, market infrastructure such as agreed-upon categories, product
prototypes, norms of exchange, or technology standards must exist to guide and stabilize transac-
tions and enable ongoing investment (Fligstein, 2001). Through such infrastructure a market can
form wherein recognition for the good or service is established among buyers, a status hierarchy
emerges among sellers, and the seller role is relatively stable (Lounsbury et al., 2003; Rao, Monin, &
Durand, 2003; White, 1981). Based on these conceptual foundations, we define markets as struc-
tured and patterned exchanges that exhibit a high degree of regularity in product/service offering,
the roles that actors play in the exchange, and the infrastructure that enables and governs the
exchange. This definition covers a range of markets, including arm’s-length exchanges, but implies
that market infrastructure requires investment and the mobilization of resources (Van de Ven, 1993).
Inherent in all efforts to form a market is uncertainty (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Santos & Eisen-
hardt, 2009). Uncertainty in a new market is directly related to the degree of novelty associated with
the product or service offering (Fleming, 2001). Uncertainty can stem from potential customers hav-
ing little or no experience with the product or service, or from their preferences being ill-formed
and/or unarticulated (Benner & Tripsas, 2012). Likewise, uncertainty can emanate from the feasibil-
ity of a product, commercial success and long-term value of a technology, or the rate of performance
improvement (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). Actors can thus conceptualize possible outcomes but
cannot reliably estimate the likelihood of those outcomes being realized (Knight, 1921).
Actors attempt to reduce market formation uncertainty via activities such as the establishment of
categories, the development of rules of exchange, or the achievement of taken-for-granted-ness in a
new market (Fligstein, 2001). All of these actions require some degree of collective action because
their attainment is usually beyond the ability and resources of any one actor. Research that invokes
collective action as a key mechanism of market formation is dominated by single case studies where
collective action is central to market formation success (e.g., Lounsbury et al., 2003; Sine & Lee,
2009; Weber et al., 2008). But without synthesis across them, single case studies shed little light on
the boundary conditions regarding the need for collective action in market formation efforts. In some
market settings, individual actors may successfully form a market by pursuing their own interests
without coordinating with other actors (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009), whereas in other market set-
tings, the market will not form unless different actors contribute beyond what they would if each
were only pursuing their individual interests (Lounsbury et al., 2003). To identify these boundary
conditions for collective action problems, we outline a theory of market formation efforts.
2.1 | Collective action and the process of market infrastructure development
An actor situated in a new market may seek to reduce market formation uncertainty through actor-
oriented efforts, activities aimed to develop one’s internal capabilities. Provided the actor perceives
sufficient returns to these contributions, she will continue to contribute resources to build these capa-
bilities and so improve her prospects in the nascent market. However, actors’ prospects depend not
only on their own capabilities but also on a developed market infrastructure that either has resulted
from the contributions of other interested actors or is available from related established markets
(Schneiberg & Berk, 2010). A fundamental challenge for actors forming markets is to “develop
social structures to mediate the problems they encounter in exchange, competition and production”
(Fligstein & Dauter, 2007, p. 9). If actors focus only on their own business success, market
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infrastructure elements such as legitimacy may still unintentionally develop as a spillover of actor-
oriented actions. (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Hence, while actors invest in their own capabilities,
de-facto categorical prototypes coalesce due to spillovers and form a critical element of the market
infrastructure.
However, in other situations, market formation may require that actors take intentional, market-
oriented (rather than actor-oriented) actions. Such actions include promoting the product category
rather than just their particular product (Navis & Glynn, 2010), organizing meetings with others con-
cerning standard-setting (Simcoe, 2012) or information exchange (Moeen & Agarwal, 2017), or col-
lectively lobbying for favorable regulation (Lee, 2009). If actors perceive that an improved market
infrastructure increases their prospects and produces a return, it is more likely that ongoing resource
contributions will occur even if those efforts require some degree of sacrifice of one’s private inter-
ests or involve coordination costs. Thus, the resource allocation problem under market formation
uncertainty is not a simple dichotomous choice between building the market or developing internal
capabilities. However, in the absence of market infrastructure, actors may be reluctant to invest in
resources to develop internal capabilities suited for the new market.
Resource allocation decisions related to developing firm capabilities and market infrastructure
are intimately tied to collective action problems and solutions. If collective action is any action
aimed at the construction of some collective good (Marwell & Oliver, 1993), then collective action
problems arise when actors refrain from committing the necessary resources for its construction,
even when a majority has an interest in its development. The likelihood and nature of collective
action problems vary across market formation efforts, and we draw upon the collective action litera-
ture to outline the sources of these collective action problems below.
2.2 | Sources of collective action problems in market formation
The first source of collective action problems is the lack of market infrastructure. If market infra-
structure exists, actors do not have to consider allocating resources to building it, and the likelihood
for collective action problems is low (Lounsbury et al., 2003; Rao et al., 2003; Weber et al., 2008).
The second source of collective action problems is low perceived returns—that is, the degree to
which actors’ contributions to building the market infrastructure (and firm capabilities) is perceived
to make a difference. The perceived returns to contributions depend on the context, and therefore
change as the market develops. During market formation, early contributions to the market infra-
structure tend to provide few tangible benefits. When market infrastructure is lacking, the costs of
contributing to its initial development may outweigh the benefits. Thus, returns to contributions are
low. However, as more contributions are made, the market infrastructure begins to take shape.
Cumulative contributions result not only in the development of market infrastructure but also in the
probability of market formation. At this point, returns to contributions are much higher. Therefore,
given uncertainty, the formation of market infrastructure in the early stages is often obstructed due
to low perceived returns to contributions.2
The third source of collective action problems is low excludability. A fundamental characteristic
of collective goods is that the benefits one actor realizes from contributing to the development of a
good spill over to others. As a result, those not contributing cannot be excluded from benefiting
from its development (Heckathorn, 1996; Olson, 1965). Excludability affects not only how actors
perceive their own prospects but also how actors may contribute to the cause. In particular, under
2This concept is akin to the concept of an accelerating production function of a collective good (Marwell & Oliver, 1993: 62–63) and
similar to technology lock-in under strong returns to scale (David & Greenstein, 1990).
246 LEE ET AL.
non-excludability actors may strategically refrain from contributing to the public good (Olson,
1965). In market formation, excludability of benefits from market infrastructure tends to be low, but
the degree to which this is true is context dependent. Excludability can result from actors possessing
intellectual property (Arrow, 1962), attaining scale economies from assets (Teece, 1986), or achiev-
ing network effects (Katz & Shapiro, 1994).
The final source of collective action problems is limited substitutability of contributions. High
substitutability implies that neither a particular combination nor the sequence of contributions is
consequential for market formation efforts (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). While contributions to collec-
tive action efforts, such as strikes and social movements, may often be considered perfectly substi-
tutable, this is generally not the case with market formation efforts. In market formation,
contributions often play a highly specific role or are sequence dependent and are therefore less sub-
stitutable (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Monge et al., 1998). For example, market formation may require
multiple and distinct contributions from actors to induce compatibility between distinct products
within a value chain (P. A. David & Greenstein, 1990), to mobilize actors to support a common
technology (Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002), or to jointly invest in complementary technolo-
gies (Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Moeen & Agarwal, 2017). When market formation requires actors to
make distinct (and therefore less substitutable) contributions, actors must undertake alignment efforts
by identifying interfaces between one another. Costs of coordination may be high and perceived
benefits from efforts to develop market infrastructure may be suppressed in cases where there are
strong needs for alignment across different contributions to market infrastructure (Ansari & Garud,
2009). In sum, market infrastructure, perceived returns to contributions, excludability, and substitut-
ability condition to what extent collective action problems emerge and, if so, whether they can be
solved by independent actors or require coordinated efforts from multiple actors.
2.3 | Actor heterogeneity
Market infrastructure, perceived returns to contributions, excludability, and substitutability affect
market-formation–related uncertainty, which in turn results in market formation problems. Yet, not
all actors respond to or perceive uncertainty in the same way. In some situations, collective action
problems are avoided as the individual interests of some actors sufficiently align with the collective
good. Collective action problems dissipate quickly if a powerful and interested actor is willing and
able to single-handedly build the needed market infrastructure. Or, market formation uncertainty
may be resolved as a few resource-rich actors lead in organizing collective action. In line with this,
much collective action literature discusses how heterogeneity in the willingness or ability of differ-
ent actors to act affects collective action problems (Granovetter, 1978; Heckathorn, 1996). While
originally intended to explain how phenomena such as strikes (Granovetter, 1978) and insurgencies
(Gould, 1991) occur, the impact of actor heterogeneity on collective action has begun to receive
attention in market settings (e.g., Von Krogh, Spaeth, & Lakhani, 2003).
Nevertheless, the likelihood that unilateral actions are sufficient to resolve market formation
uncertainty depends on the problems to be resolved. We therefore consider how actor heterogeneity
in a new market affects the likelihood of collective action problems and the solutions that actors
may draw upon to resolve these problems and thereby facilitate market formation. We focus on two
conceptions of actor heterogeneity: willingness of actors to contribute to the development of market
infrastructure and the actual ability to do so. In markets, heterogeneity in actor willingness or ability
is a fundamental premise of strategic management. Actors vary in initial resource endowments
(e.g., Shane & Stuart, 2002), knowledge bases (Moeen & Agarwal, 2017), specific capabilities
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), and in growth orientations (Eggers & Kaplan, 2009), and these
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variations influence interests in and motivations for market formation (Fauchart & Gruber, 2011).
Further, a variety of sociocultural forces condition new market entry (York & Lenox, 2014). For
example, a market may be populated with ideologically motivated pioneering producers
(e.g., microbrewers, grass-fed meat producers) as well as those only seeking profits. In contrast to
solely profit-oriented actors, those driven largely by ideology may be willing to build market infra-
structure, despite low perceived economic returns. We posit that actor heterogeneity affects market
formation success as it interacts with the four sources of collective action problems.
3 | COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: AN
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
We now set forth an integrative framework for assessing the degree to which collective action is
important for market formation. We focus on how particular configurations of factors help or hurt
market formation efforts depending on the particular situation of market formation. We build on the
four sources of collective action problems outlined earlier—market infrastructure, perceived returns
to contributions, excludability, and substitutability. In Figure 1, we present each as a question and
then provide answers to those questions in a structured diagram, resulting in five ideal-typical states.
Using the framework in Figure 1, we identify within- and between-state regularities and varia-
tion in collective action problems and solutions through the use of specific examples. We relate the
respective states to different degrees and types of uncertainty facing actors during market formation
efforts to identify state-level regularities (Figure 2). While prior literature highlights the relevance of
uncertainty to market formation efforts, it generally fails to distinguish between different types of
State 1:  
No collective action 
problems 
State 2:  
1st mover benefits; 
some gridlock risk 
State 3:
2nd mover benefits; 
free-riding risk 
State 4:  
Risk of  start-up 
problem 
State 5: 
Risk of  start-up 
problem with 
coordination 
challenges 
N Y 
N Y N Y 
I.  
Is the market 
infrastructure 
sufficiently developed? 
III.  
Are benefits  
from my contributions easily 
excludable?
IV.  
Are my and others’ 
contributions easily 
substitutable?
II.  
Do I perceive
contributions to the market 
infrastructure to be making a 
substantive  
difference? 
N Y 
Contributions are 
perceived  
to make a  
difference 
Contributions are 
perceived  
not to make a 
difference 
Developed 
market 
infrastructure 
FIGURE 1 Collective action analytical framework
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uncertainty. We follow a logical differentiation between two key types—demand uncertainty and
supply uncertainty (e.g., Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987). Because reducing
supply uncertainty involves different activities from those involved in reducing demand uncertainty,
situations characterized by high demand versus supply uncertainty may be associated with different
types of collective action problems and solutions. This distinction helps explain empirical regulari-
ties of collective action problems and solutions in market formation.
Demand uncertainty (Figure 2, vertical axis) is the perceived unpredictability of consumer pref-
erences (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2004; Benner & Tripsas, 2012). The key com-
ponent of demand uncertainty is cognitive recognition of a new product or service’s value.
Empirical research validates the importance of cognitive recognition and acceptance of a good or
service in mitigating demand uncertainty (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Rao, 1994; Rosa, Porac,
Runser-Spanjol, & Saxon, 1999). Demand uncertainty arises from shifts in and unpredictability of
consumer preferences (Tripsas, 2008). When relationships between producers and consumers stabi-
lize, demand uncertainty lessens (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007; Weber et al., 2008). Typical actions to
resolve high demand uncertainty include product experimentation and market research (Bingham &
Davis, 2012); developing category frames (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008), schemes (Schneiberg & Berk,
2010), or narratives (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001); and creating collective producer identities
(Navis & Glynn, 2010).
Supply uncertainty is a second primary type of uncertainty. Supply uncertainty (Figure 2, hori-
zontal axis), is the absence (perceived or real) of producers and suppliers of a new good or service
or the perceived unpredictability of existing ways to produce a product or service in a new market
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; McGrath, 1997). Supply uncertainty exists
when there is confusion about how to act or when there are inadequate capabilities to develop and
Nouvelle cuisine 
Electric vehicles 
Aspartame 
Groupon 
E-cigarettes 
Personal digital assistants (early) 
VHS vs Betamax 
Microbrewing 
Search engines 
Minivans 
Modern Indian art 
Radio (early) 
Cochlear implants 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Grass-fed meat 
5 
Online  
streaming 
2 
Wind power (early) 
5 
Mobile payments 
2 
State 2:  
1st mover benefits; 
some gridlock risk 
State 3:
2nd mover benefits; 
free-riding risk 
State 4:  
Risk of start-up 
problem 
State 5: 
State 1:  
No collective 
action 
problems 
Risk of start-up 
problem with 
coordination 
challenges 
High  
Demand  
Uncertainty 
High 
Supply  
Uncertainty 
Low 
Demand & Supply  
Uncertainty 
Space travel 
5 
Satellite radio 
5 
FIGURE 2 Market formation uncertainty and market formation states
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deliver the product to market. Supply uncertainty also involves the lack of knowledge to secure
needed inputs, capital, partners, and other critical resources. Reducing supply uncertainty requires
the creation of material and social structures corresponding to the nature of relationships among and
within producers (Fligstein & Dauter, 2007; Moeen & Agarwal, 2017; Weber et al., 2008). Typical
actions to reduce supply uncertainty include investing in R&D; building venture skills and produc-
tion knowledge; establishing supplier relationships; forming joint ventures; developing industry stan-
dards, exchange technologies, or complementary technologies; and achieving favorable regulation
(Van de Ven, 1993).
We further characterize the empirical regularities by considering how heterogeneous actors
impact collective action problems and solutions within each of the states outlined in Figures 1 and
2. We summarize the most fundamental problems—those involving greater market formation
uncertainty—in a number of propositions. Finally, we discuss the value of applying the framework
longitudinally to market formation efforts, showing how collective action problems shift across
states as the market develops and how solutions to those problems evolve. We begin by moving
through Figure 1 starting with the question in diamond I: Is the market infrastructure sufficiently
developed?
3.1 | Developed market infrastructure (State 1)
If the market infrastructure is sufficiently developed, then there is no basis for collective action prob-
lems (Figure 1, top left shaded area, “State 1”). For example, Groupon created a new market of
online discounted vouchers by connecting buyers and sellers in a novel way (Edelman, Jaffe, &
Kominers, 2016). Although the product category is new, it is based on longstanding norms and prac-
tices of coupon exchange. Groupon relied on extant market infrastructure—existing knowledge
structures, input factor markets, and norms that enabled successful market formation. Thus, in cases
where market infrastructure is developed, market formation occurs as a result of actors pursuing
their individual interests (Kirzner, 1973). Because the market infrastructure in State 1 is well devel-
oped, consumers understand the nature of the product or service offering and demand for it exists.
On the supply side, existing resources can be exploited to provide needed inputs and the requisite
knowledge to do so exists. In other words, perceived supply and demand uncertainty is low
(Figure 2, State 1), there is little basis for collective action problems, and market formation success
does not hinge upon the heterogeneity of actors that engage in market formation efforts.
3.2 | Contributions make a substantive difference (States 2 and 3)
If the market infrastructure is not sufficiently developed, then the likelihood of collective action
problems increases. Underdeveloped market infrastructure leads to the next question—Do actors
perceive that their contributions to building market infrastructure increase the probability of market
formation (Figure 1, diamond II)? If actors perceive that their contributions make a difference, this
leads to the question in diamond III: Are benefits from my contributions easily excludable?
(Figure 1, shaded area bottom left). When the benefits from contributions are highly excludable,
actors have a strong incentive to contribute to market infrastructure because they will benefit from
doing so (Figure 1, “State 2”). The possibility of appropriating value from developing the market
infrastructure is likely when some actors already possess specialized capabilities or assets and enjoy
strong scale economies (Ozcan & Santos, 2015; Teece, 1986). Excludability implies that when one
or a few actors recognize an opportunity, and are able and willing to act, they will benefit from
first-mover advantages (Bekkers, Duysters, & Verspagen, 2002). Here, collective action problems
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are unlikely and the probability of market formation is much higher. The market for sugar substi-
tutes is a good illustration. As part of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, sugar substitutes in
the United States were required to obtain approval from the Food and Drug Administration prior to
market introduction. In 1965, a researcher at the pharmaceutical company G. D. Searle &
Co. discovered a combination of amino acids that he labeled Aspartame and for which the company
obtained patents in the early 1970s. It took several years to scale up production, but despite being
three times more expensive than Sweet’N Low (a saccharin-based product), Aspartame found great
success in the dry use market (Brandenburger, 1993). The company then focused on the soft drink
market and eventually replaced saccharin as the artificial sweetener of choice by both Coke and
Pepsi.
State 2 market formation efforts tend to involve moderately low market formation uncertainty
(Figure 2, State 2). Because of high excludability, when two or more pioneering organizations or
coalitions compete to establish a de-facto standard or format, market formation may be hindered by
gridlock (Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). Because the race to become the future dominant design
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990) implies winning the market (at least temporarily), coalitions vie for
dominance, exemplified by the battle between Betamax and VHS (Cusumano, Mylonadis, & Rosen-
bloom, 1992). Gridlock occurs when actors cannot convince other actors in the value chain to com-
mit to their technology. For instance, compatible fax systems stalled for decades until the 1970s
(Rohlfs, 2001). Similarly, actors in the formation of the mobile payment market struggled to reach
an agreement on market architecture due to their prior dominance in their respective industries
(Ozcan & Santos, 2015). While delaying market formation, such gridlocks are often temporary.
Solutions may come through strategies that seek collaboration with competitors (Axelrod, Mitchell,
Thomas, Bennett, & Bruderer, 1995) or through policies that stimulate compatibility (Farrell &
Klemperer, 2007).
Heterogeneity in actors’ ability or willingness has a mixed impact on gridlock problems and
solutions. While heterogeneity in actor strategies increases the likelihood of competing coalitions,
heterogeneity in capabilities facilitates selection of some coalitions over others because they are
more easily adopted.
State 3 is like State 2 in that actors face relatively low market formation uncertainty and per-
ceived returns to contributions are relatively high (see Figure 2, States 2 and 3). However, State
3 differs from State 2 in that the benefits from contributing to market infrastructure are not easily
excludable (Figure 1, “State 3,” following a “No” to the question in diamond III).3
The limited excludability in State 3 implies that second-mover advantages exist, despite the pres-
ence of high returns to contributions (Markides & Geroski, 2005). For example, in the context of
search engine markets (Figure 2), many companies had access to novel market infrastructure innova-
tions such as developments in Internet advertising. Although Google adopted these technologies
later than many of its rivals, it rose to dominance thanks to its strong internal capabilities to develop
superior search algorithms (Cusumano, 2005). In cases where actor contributions are not excludable,
others may reap benefits at the cost of earlier contributors while evading the cost of contributing
(Heckathorn, 1996; Olson, 1965). This suggests a possible free-riding problem. An illustration of a
free-riding problem is the formation of interoperability or public standards. The establishment of
standards requires negotiations between market actors. Because standards involve investment and
coordination across committed actors, and because standards are readily available to late entrants,
3There is no compelling theoretical argument for why excludability is more or less associated with either demand or supply uncer-
tainty. The collection of empirical examples from within the two states did not suggest any pattern among these dimensions. There-
fore, we have grouped States 2 and 3 together in Figure 2.
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actors can strategically free-ride on the efforts of those that initially developed them (Farrell &
Saloner, 1988). For example, the formation of pay cable TV required the adoption of a protocol for
scrambling satellite signals. Once Home Box Office, the largest player in the market, chose the pro-
prietary scrambling system of the firm VideoCipher, this technology was adopted by most cable TV
programmers within 2 years (Farrell & Saloner, 1986). More broadly, free-riding is often a problem
in contexts of industry self-regulation (Lenox, 2006).
While free-riding is common and may sometimes delay market formation, it is unlikely to deter
it. This is particularly the case for situations with heterogeneous actors. Because willing and able
early movers often anticipate receiving sufficient private benefits from developing market infrastruc-
ture, they are likely to take the lead in such efforts. The market for electronic cigarettes provides
such a case. The modern e-cigarette is a battery-powered nicotine delivery system invented in 2003
by a Chinese pharmacist. This new product market grew dramatically, generating $7 billion in
global sales, with over 450 brands producing over 7,500 unique flavors (Zhu et al., 2014). However,
its success depended heavily on government regulation. By 2010, many countries banned or strictly
regulated e-cigarettes, but in the United States e-cigarettes remained exempt from regulation and
have only recently been banned for sale to minors (New York Times, 2016). Collective lobbying
efforts from industry associations such as the Electronic Cigarette Association and Vapers Interna-
tional Inc. enabled these favorable regulatory conditions (Noel, Rees, & Connolly, 2011). New
companies—about 10 per month in 2014—were able to free-ride on the lobbying efforts of pioneer-
ing players in e-cigarettes because the benefits were non-excludable. Even though early movers may
face free-riding by others, they may undertake action as long as they perceive sufficient benefits
from joining efforts or when the cost of not participating is too large (Lenox, 2006). Even though
free-riding behavior may sometimes hurt early movers, free-riding may also facilitate market
formation.
3.3 | Contributions do not make a substantive difference (States 4 and 5)
Returning to diamond II in Figure 1, the “No” branch captures situations where there is not a clear
indication that contributions make a substantive difference to market infrastructure development
(Figure 1, shaded area bottom right). Here the possibility of the start-up problem exists—a situation
where the costs of contributing outweigh the benefits (at least initially). This problem differs from
free-riding in that the crux of the start-up problem is not whether people will free ride, but who will
initiate those efforts. The start-up problem “is one of feasibility, the problem of inadequate interests
and inadequate resources to overcome start-up costs. The usual outcome … is that nobody rides free
because nobody contributes and there is no ride” (Marwell & Oliver, 1993, p. 92, emphasis added).
Thus, the start-up problem is a higher barrier to market formation efforts than free-riding, as it logi-
cally precedes it. The start-up problem characterizes States 4 and 5.
Given that the start-up problem involves the interdependence of actor contributions, a critical
next question is the degree to which actor contributions are substitutable. Thus, we ask in diamond
IV: Are my and others’ contributions easily substitutable? Even if contributions are easily substitut-
able (the “yes” branch of diamond IV), low returns to contributions for initial contributors means
that unless some actors are willing to assume start-up costs, collective action never occurs
(Heckathorn, 1996) and actors face a start-up problem (“State 4,” Figure 1). A good example of a
State 4 market formation effort is Nouvelle cuisine (Rao et al., 2003). For nearly a century, classical
cuisine dominated French gastronomy. As the prevailing orthodoxy, classical cuisine emphasized
conservatism and conformity to formulaic rules and practices. Transforming a market dominated by
classic gastronomy involved major start-up costs. Key to the success of Nouvelle cuisine was
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convincing other chefs, especially those of high status, to adopt new practices, principles, and ingre-
dients. Given the highly professionalized nature of the industry and its societal importance, moving
away from classical cuisine involved risks for restaurateurs of being rejected by customers and pow-
erful food critics. Hence, building the legitimacy of Nouvelle cuisine vis-à-vis its classical counter-
part provided low early returns to contributions for two decades.
In the case of Nouvelle cuisine, the market formation uncertainty was predominantly demand-
related. The legitimacy of Nouvelle cuisine in the eyes of consumers and critics presented a formida-
ble obstacle to the development of this market—not the lack of culinary talent, recipes, or other
supply-side concerns. This combination of high demand uncertainty and low supply uncertainty is
representative of State 4 (Figure 2, State 4). In market formation efforts falling under State 4, actors
have developed a product (or can easily do so from existing knowledge and input markets), but
there is demand uncertainty regarding its meaning, utility, and/or desirability. As a result, little to no
demand exists and the willingness to pay is low. Here, collective action problems center on gaining
recognition for new product categories. In the early stages of such markets, labels are unstable,
incomplete, and disjointed (Rosa et al., 1999). Producers collectively discover and shape the use and
users of the new market category, identifying and reaching some consensus regarding early product
attributes (Montgomery, Dacin, & Dacin, 2012). Demand uncertainty lessens as product categories
become coherent and legitimate (Doganova & Karnøe, 2015).
Substitutability of actions that facilitate the resolution of demand uncertainty tends to be rela-
tively high in State 4. While actions that increase legitimacy, such as storytelling and enlisting advo-
cates, require consistency over time, achieving this typically does not require specific and deliberate
alignment—rather, more exposure is better. Conditions of high substitutability mean that the resolu-
tion of collective action problems depends more on the total rather than on the specific resource
commitments. But due to the start-up problem, individual actors rarely are able or willing to unilat-
erally resolve high demand uncertainty. Consequently, market formation often requires intentional
coordination of collective action. Through coordination, actors develop shared identities that build
and cement the meaning of a market category by enacting similar market-focused actions. As with
Nouvelle cuisine, the U.S. microbrewery market involved intensive intentional coordination to
establish a collective producer identity and a recognized product category. Microbrewers collectively
identified and tightly coordinated the promotion of a distinctive set of product attributes based on
taste, craftsmanship, lifestyle, anti-mass-production sentiment, love for crafting, and tradition
(Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). Formal coordination and promotion occurred through organizations
such as the Association of Brewers and the Institute of Brewing Studies (McKendrick & Carroll,
2001). These arguments lead to our first proposition:
Proposition 1 (P1) Market formation efforts involving high demand uncertainty tend
to involve start-up problems, resulting in a need for coordinated collective action.
However, solutions to State 4 start-up problems do not necessarily need to be intentionally coor-
dinated. Developing a recognized new product market category may emerge as a byproduct of moti-
vated actors pursuing their own interests. For example, as actors highlight distinct dimensions of
their new product (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Rosa et al., 1999), they challenge and deinstitutionalize
prevailing products and practices (Lounsbury et al., 2003; Rao et al., 2000). As more actors engage
in sensemaking and sensegiving, an array of product attributes become recognized as a product cate-
gory by consumers (Kennedy, 2008). To illustrate, product attributes such as “low step-in height,”
“seven passenger,” and “cargo space large enough for a 4 × 8 sheet of plywood between the wheel
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wells” came to be constitutive of the product category of “minivan” (Rosa et al., 1999). Thus, efforts
by a few motivated actors may spill over, leading to market formation.
In State 4, actor heterogeneity may also catalyze market formation when actor-oriented contribu-
tions do not easily spill over to the market infrastructure. Some actors may choose to engage in mar-
ket formation efforts, despite high uncertainty because of ideological or intrinsic motivation
(Boudreau & Lakhani, 2011; Lee et al., 2017). In this situation, first movers may fail and more stra-
tegic second movers capitalize on their efforts (Markides & Geroski, 2005), creating a situation that
resembles that of State 3. Consider the online bookstore market, where market formation uncertainty
was high. Books.com and others that pioneered the category and built consumer familiarity paved
the way for Amazon to enter and scale the market (Raff, 2000). Thus, the presence of actor hetero-
geneity (in willingness and ability) may reduce the likelihood of start-up problems. Together, these
arguments lead to our second proposition:
Proposition 2 (P2) Heterogeneity in actor ability/willingness reduces the need for
coordinated collective action in market formation.
The start-up problem of State 4 is compounded when actors’ contributions are imperfectly sub-
stitutable (the “No” branch of diamond IV, Figure 1). Contributions are needed from a variety of
actors such as market intermediaries, state agencies, educational organizations, and producers of
complementary goods—all of whom perform distinct roles, possess unique capabilities, or control
resources that others do not (“State 5,” Figure 1). A key issue in overcoming the start-up problem in
State 5 is alignment—the coordination of not only the provision of sufficient resources but also dis-
tinct resources in the right amount and proper sequence for infrastructure development (Guérard,
Bode, & Gustafsson, 2013; Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). Misalignment reduces the perceived value of
all contributions and suppresses further contributions. The need for intentional coordination to align
crucial contributions that are substitutable increases the likelihood and severity of the start-up prob-
lem. Moreover, competing ideas about how to develop market infrastructure can complicate coordi-
nation efforts because in such situations it is unclear and/or contentious what actors should be
coordinating. These elements intensify the underlying start-up problem. The emergence of alterna-
tive fuel vehicles is a good example. For decades, vehicle producers introduced many alternative
fuel vehicles (hybrid electric vehicles [EVs], pure EVs, plug-in hybrid EVs, hydrogen fuel cell vehi-
cles, diesels, etc.). These producers face uncertainty about how to shape demand and whether,
which, and at what rate consumers will buy their vehicles. They also face uncertainty about which
fuel types or technology standards to commit to. Therefore, market infrastructure is not well devel-
oped and requires diverse contributions. Contributing further to the uncertainty is the presence of
strong economies of scale, providing cost advantages for high-volume producers.
In 2007, the company BetterPlace positioned itself as an industry coordinator to provide batteries
and a battery-swapping infrastructure for EVs. BetterPlace viewed international standards as critical
to the success of the EV market and attempted to persuade key market players including auto-
makers, utility companies, charge station providers, and city governments to participate (Etzion &
Struben, 2015). Despite backing by governments, NGOs, and external investors as well as demon-
strations through actual launches in Israel and Denmark, BetterPlace had great difficulty mobilizing
automobile providers and generating consumer interest. As a result, BetterPlace filed for bankruptcy
in November 2013. This example demonstrates how low substitutability across various market infra-
structure elements intensifies collective action problems.
State 5 is generally characterized by high supply uncertainty (see Figure 2). High supply uncer-
tainty is compounded in State 5 as distinct supply-side activities/resources contribute to distinct
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elements of market infrastructure. In the commercialization of radio broadcasting, for example,
actors needed the integration of technological components for transmitting and receiving radio sig-
nals (Leblebici et al., 1991). This required alignment between multiple actors. The challenge of
coordinating alignment was exacerbated by market actors viewing technology as private property
protected by patents. In general, unlike mitigating demand uncertainty through the accumulation of
sufficient resources irrespective of who contributes, mitigating supply uncertainty usually requires
that actors explicitly coordinate with one another to overcome alignment challenges. Taken together,
these arguments lead to our third proposition:
Proposition 3 (P3) Market formation efforts involving high supply uncertainty tend to
involve alignment challenges, exacerbating the start-up problem and increasing the
need for coordinated collective action.
While alignment problems characterize supply-side concerns, other State 5 examples reveal chal-
lenges arising from both supply and demand uncertainty. Markets such as alternative fuel vehicles
(Etzion & Struben, 2015), early personal digital assistants (Bayus, 1997), cochlear implants (Van de
Ven & Garud, 1993), and grass-fed meat (Weber et al., 2008) all lacked demand- and supply-side
market infrastructure components (Figure 2, State 5), which required alignment across actors to
develop. Likewise, nascent markets such as space travel are slow to take off, as actors cannot envi-
sion how demand will take shape and supply challenges are numerous (Huang, Menon, & Zuzul,
2016). The need for alignment to develop market infrastructure means that many State 5 markets
require intentional coordination. The U.S. wind power industry struggled for years despite substan-
tial regulatory incentives and financial resources. Producers did not coordinate efforts, and evalua-
tors focused on selecting best designs rather than on improving designs. As a result, lack of
alignment coupled with limited knowledge sharing led to a fragmented market that languished in its
early days (Garud & Karnøe, 2003). By contrast, Danish firms deployed resources to build a wind
turbine market through deliberate coordinated efforts across multiple types of actors as a joint learn-
ing and alignment process (Garud & Karnøe, 2003).
The presence of high actor heterogeneity in State 5 amplifies the need for intentional coordina-
tion. While actor heterogeneity mitigates collective action problems when contributions are highly
substitutable (as in State 4), we posit that it has the opposite effect in State 5. Actor heterogeneity
combined with low contribution substitutability suggests that while willing and able actors may
develop some components of the market infrastructure, actors possessing other critical components
might be missing or unwilling to contribute. Consequently, there may be insufficient or uneven
development of market infrastructure, which further reduces the perceived returns from investing in
the market infrastructure and, with that, future contributions. Because heterogeneity can amplify
misalignment, it can also intensify collective action problems and increase the need for coordination
to align the distinct actions. High supply-side uncertainty and multiple coordination challenges char-
acterized the nascent satellite radio market (Navis & Glynn, 2010). Initial market formation involved
a 7-year battle with the FCC to allocate frequency spectrum because of organized resistance from
incumbents in terrestrial radio. Plus, Sirius and XM had to secure massive start-up capital and
develop technologies such as broadcasting satellites and receivers. Product development involved
over 270 partnerships between the two firms, and although regulation set basic standards
(e.g., bandwidth restrictions), their implementation had to be collectively achieved. Thus, because
market infrastructure was lacking and its development involved limited substitutability, Sirius and
XM deliberately coordinated early efforts to facilitate market formation. Once the market
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infrastructure sufficiently developed, both firms pursued competitive growth strategies (Navis &
Glynn, 2010). Overall, these arguments lead to our final proposition:
Proposition 4 (P4) Heterogeneity in actor ability/willingness increases alignment
challenges for start-up problems with low contribution substitutability.
In State 5 successful coordination requires trust, reliability, and a reputation (Bateson, 1988),
something especially difficult to achieve when actors are heterogeneous. It is here that critical part-
ners may lack sufficient incentive to take part in market formation efforts (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).
Further, disputes among distinct actors magnify collective action problems, as they increase the risk
of premature dissolution of intentional coordination (Benford & Snow, 2000). With low substitut-
ability and actor heterogeneity, market formation is therefore more likely when there are preexisting
industry bodies and associations, powerful lead actors, or strong norms among those involved. The
formation of the biotech industry (Whittington, Owen-Smith, & Powell, 2009) illustrates the impor-
tance of a favorable environment that provides social, geographic, and physical propinquity, stimu-
lating the formation of collaborative networks across a diverse set of actors.
The compounding effect of supply and demand uncertainty, low substitutability, and actor het-
erogeneity makes market formation very challenging and can result in several market outcomes.
First, markets can fail. During the 1980s, the New Zealand natural gas vehicle market benefited
from strong intentional coordination between private and public partners (Sperling, 1988), evidenced
by the establishment of a committee within the Ministry of Energy to increase consumer awareness,
coordinate the rollout of fuel stations, establish quality standards, and keep fuel affordable. But, after
early demand and supply growth, the nascent market collapsed when the government withdrew sup-
port (Flynn, 2002). Second, markets may develop but remain local and unscalable as solutions that
resolve demand uncertainty may be inconsistent with those that address producer identities. Grass-
fed meat (Weber et al., 2008) remained local, as scaling-up was partially inconsistent with the
collective producer identity. Third, market formation may stall due to multiple competing but
incompatible ideas. Segway failed because it was unable to define a specific market segment and
lacked a supportive and dedicated market infrastructure, including favorable regulation and clarity
about how it could be used and by whom (Sloane, 2012). Likewise, in the automotive industry,
competing ideas about the relative prospects of different propulsion systems, including hydrogen,
electric, and natural gas, remain largely unresolved (Sperling & Gordon, 2009). The compounding
effects of supply and demand uncertainty complicate actors’ abilities to foresee market outcomes
and to develop a common vision about what to align and how to do it. Similarly, while intentional
coordination is critical under conditions of supply and demand uncertainty, it is difficult to achieve
and prone to failure. Willing and able actors may not be sufficient to overcome collective action
problems, and powerful actors like the state may have to step in.
Overall, our framework (see Figures 1 and 2) details a novel model for market formation by
revealing five different market formation states, each of which faces different degrees and forms of
collective action problems. In States 2 and 3, collective action problems may occur despite returns
from actor contributions. However, free-riding and gridlock are unlikely to hinder market formation
in the long run. By contrast, the most fundamental collective action problem—the start-up
problem—is likely to occur in States 4 and 5, where perceived returns to contributions are low. State
5, characterized by low substitutability among resource contributions, faces an even larger collective
action problem due to the coordination challenges associated with alignment concerns.
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3.4 | Interstate dynamics of collective action and market formation
The states identified in Figure 1 are ideal-typical and, as such, should be viewed as abstractions that
do not embody all empirical realities of market formation efforts. Similarly, markets are dynamic—
they evolve over time and will move through multiple states outlined in our framework. As they do,
the existence, nature, and severity of collective action problems change. Market formation tends to
move toward State 1 as actors seek to mitigate uncertainty. Yet, given market dynamism, endoge-
nous or exogenous changes will generate new uncertainties and, with them, potentially new and var-
ied collective action problems, shifting markets from one state to another. To account for this
dynamism, we describe how collective action problems and solutions change based on the stage of
market formation. In Figure 3, we highlight two published cases of market formation, Modern
Indian art (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010) and early radio (Leblebici et al., 1991), and discuss how
their market formation problems evolved from state to state.
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FIGURE 3 Two illustrative pathways of market formation and evolution
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Consider the market of Modern Indian art (Figure 3(a), from State 4 to State 1), which formed
between 1985 and 2007 (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010). Before 1985, Indian art lacked a distinct and
recognized category. Instead, it was lumped into a larger “hodgepodge” of South East Asian art
objects. Consequently, little demand for Indian art existed. Auction houses and galleries had no
interest and held no dedicated exhibitions. Given these challenges, Indian art was largely in State
4 between 1985 and 1995, due to high demand uncertainty but low supply uncertainty. With an
increasing critique of modernism, opportunities arose for a category of Modern Indian art. Efforts to
build this category and establish a valuation system were non-excludable because all market actors
could benefit from this infrastructure—from artists to buyers. But, there were a few actors, such as
the new auction house Saffronart, that were motivated and had the capabilities to develop materials
in magazines and online media to help codify the category (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010). Saffronart
was therefore able to overcome this collective action problem by creating a good that could be val-
ued through loose coordination across auction houses (moving the market from State 4 to State
3, still characterized by considerable demand uncertainty). Once this was resolved, the market infra-
structure developed, and more actors such as high-status museums adopted the category. Subse-
quently, auction houses advanced the development of the market by creating specialized exhibitions
of Modern Indian art, thus making more within-category distinctions. These differentiation efforts
occurred without further coordination (moving from State 3 to State 1).
Early radio also illustrates how collective action problems evolve during market formation
(Figure 3(b), from State 5 to State 1). During the 1920s, radio faced several collective action prob-
lems (Leblebici et al., 1991) because little market infrastructure existed (State 5, under high demand
and supply uncertainty). Coordination related to supply required addressing two main issues:
(a) “To whom do the airwaves belong?” and (b) “Who should have access?” Resolving the alloca-
tion, use, and transfer of spectrum rights involved a number of regulatory agencies. Having solved
the coordination of the spectrum, the radio broadcasting market then had to address the technologi-
cal interdependence of the radio equipment (Leblebici et al., 1991). The resolution of this issue
required alignment between actors to achieve an integrated technological system that could transmit
and receive radio signals. To solve this, major players made pooling agreements with one another
(from State 5 to State 4). Further, as the radio industry organizers tried to coordinate supply, ideas
about demand shifted. Whereas market incumbents still conceived of radio as a way to collect a toll
from senders to specific addressees, hobbyists used the nascent infrastructure and technologies for
broadcasting (Leblebici et al., 1991). This stimulated the development of a market for broadcasting
and broadcast content (reduced demand uncertainty, State 4).
These two examples demonstrate the dynamic nature of market formation processes and how
particular markets, as they move through different market states, will face unique collective action
problems. While the pathways by which new markets move from state to state differ, market forma-
tion generally involves a movement from higher to lower states of uncertainty and, with that, from
more to less complex and problematic collective action problems. Although there is a tendency to
move toward lower uncertainty, this path is not inevitable. In situations where collective action is
problematic, markets are prone to failure, as we illustrated in the cases of alternative fuel vehicles
(BetterPlace, and natural gas in New Zealand) and Segway.
4 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Despite much work on market formation, little progress has been made in abstracting from specific
markets to develop a general theory of market formation (Fligstein, 2001). While studies on market
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formation explore various dimensions of collective action, there is a notable lack of understanding
regarding the emerging and unfolding role of collective action in market formation in those studies.
Specifically, scholars criticize the conventional practice of identifying a market that has already
formed and then working backward to explain determinants of its formation (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006:
32; McKendrick & Carroll, 2001). Relying on observations that begin after the initiation of market
formation—including the shaping of individual and collective action—means that much of the initial
factors that may have been crucial to market formation remain unobserved. While markets that have
survived long enough to provide data may still struggle to be perceived as legitimate, they have
likely overcome early critical collective action problems we identify. As a result, scholars largely
neglect such problems because their resolution generally inheres in, and is disguised by, market for-
mation. Such neglect is particularly problematic because how collective action problems are
resolved shapes and directs subsequent action that influences market formation efforts and the actors
involved. We address this neglect and add to the literature by developing a more comprehensive
framework of collective action in market formation than what currently exists.
We provide several insights regarding collective action in market formation. First, by identifying
the three key factors that condition successful market infrastructure development—perceived returns
to contributions, degree of excludability of benefits, and degree of substitutability between
contributions—we are better able to detail the presence and type of collective action problems that
hinder successful market formation. They include gridlock, free-riding, start-up problems, and coor-
dination challenges (see Table 1, “Collective action market formation problems”). Gridlock and
free-riding involve collective action problems that occur despite perceptible returns from actor con-
tributions. But these issues are unlikely to hinder market formation in the long run. Early movers
may invest in market infrastructure even if others free-ride (Lenox, 2006). By contrast, the main col-
lective action problem in market formation is the start-up problem, which occurs when perceived
returns to contributions are low. In market formation, the start-up problem is further compounded
by coordination problems arising from low substitutability of resource contributions.
Second, we identify regularities and variation in collective action problems and solutions. The
severity of collective action problems is correlated with the perceived degree and nature of the
underlying uncertainty facing market actors (see Table 1, “Characteristic market formation uncer-
tainty”). While start-up problems often arise in situations where demand uncertainty is high
(e.g., creative industries; Rao et al., 2003), situations involving supply-side uncertainty
(e.g., complex technologies; Van de Ven, 1993) have additional alignment challenges (P1 and P3).
Third, we add by revealing how different actor configurations—defined as the presence of het-
erogeneity in actor willingness and ability to act—help explain variation in market formation out-
comes (see Table 1, “Effect of heterogeneity in actor ability/willingness on collective action
solutions”). Actor heterogeneity reduces the need for intentional coordination in start-up problems
(P2), but in situations of low substitutability of actor contributions, heterogeneity can exacerbate
rather than mitigate collective action and can increase the need for intentional coordination (P4).
Fourth, we contribute by demonstrating how collective action problems and solutions are not
static but change over time as markets evolve. Markets stabilize by moving from high uncertainty to
low uncertainty. For example, a new market may begin in State 5 (high demand and supply uncer-
tainty), transition to State 4 as actors resolve supply uncertainty, and ultimately arrive in State 1 (see
Figure 3). This shift is generally correlated with a reduction in the number and severity of collective
action problems facing market actors. Further, while there is a tendency to move from higher to
lower states of uncertainty, this path is not set. Since empirical studies suggest that collective action
problems underlie the failure of markets (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015; Ozcan & Santos, 2015; Rao et al.,
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2000), markets do not necessarily move to a state of lower market uncertainty, despite significant
efforts on the part of interested actors. However, markets with start-up problems may succeed
despite limited coordination if sufficient time is given for the requisite resources to accumulate and
sufficient market infrastructure to form. Thus, our framework clarifies when during the market for-
mation process coordination is needed and when not.
Finally, while scholars study the actors and actions that contribute to the construction of market
infrastructure (R. J. David, Sine, & Haveman, 2013; Garud et al., 2002; Lee, 2009; Wijen & Ansari,
2007; Weber et al., 2008), what remains understudied is the nature of these contributions and their
degree of intentionality. We contribute by differentiating between two important but often
confounded types of actions: actor-oriented efforts that develop actors’ own capabilities, and
market-oriented efforts that develop the market infrastructure. Additional research that explores the
implications of distinct actions for market infrastructure development would be helpful.
Overall, by shedding new light on the conditions that lead to collective action problems during
market formation efforts, the forms these problems take, and the solutions pursued, we contribute to
the literature by setting forth a multifaceted framework that offers a more thorough understanding of
market formation dynamics than what currently exists. By differentiating between actor-oriented and
market-oriented actions, we connect questions of firm success to those about market success, with
implications for research on value creation and value appropriation. Moreover, by revealing, (a) the
relevance of actor-oriented and market-oriented efforts to the development of market infrastructure,
(b) the increased criticality of start-up problems, and (c) the unarticulated roles of supply and demand
uncertainly and actor heterogeneity, as well as how these factors combine and evolve over time, we
set forth a needed agenda for future research seeking to understand such market formation dynamics.
We believe our theory extends to other instances of emergence such as new organizational cate-
gories, forms, fields, and industries. Given the selection mechanisms that operate on efforts to create
entities, there are few studies of formation failure. This paucity is consistent with related phenom-
ena, such as failed diffusion efforts (Strang & Soule, 1998), failed efforts at institutional change
(Rao & Giorgi, 2006), and category dissolution (Kennedy & Fiss, 2013). We contend that understu-
died causes in many of these cases are collective action problems and subsequent coordination fail-
ure (Gulati, Lawrence, & Puranam, 2005). We stress the need for more research into how and when
coordination may break down during market formation efforts. While collaboration may eventually
give way to competition, its premature dissolution may hinder market formation (Garud & Karnøe,
2003). Factors central to effective interorganizational collaboration, such as niche overlap and social
identity, have been identified (Ingram & Yue, 2008), but more work is required to characterize the
different forms of interorganizational coordination in new market contexts and how they evolve as
markets mature. Our framework adds to this by suggesting that different forms of coordination are
enacted during market formation. For example, successful collaboration depends on the state of the
market and whether actors maintain different roles. Thus, while socially skilled actors may effec-
tively mobilize resources by eliciting cooperation from others (Fligstein, 2001), their ultimate suc-
cess is contingent on the severity of collective action problems.
Our study also holds implications for entrepreneurship. Whereas entrepreneurs are central actors
in the formation of new markets, collective action is a key mechanism by which entrepreneurs can
overcome many challenges in new market formation (Gurses & Ozcan, 2015). Our theoretical
framework underscores the uncertainty in outcomes inherent in the pursuit of new opportunities.
Much of the literature in entrepreneurship implicitly assumes a tight coupling between the actions of
actors and outcomes that lead to formation. In some cases this assumption is justified, such as when
market formation conditions allow an “era of ferment” to be resolved through pioneering and
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perhaps naïve actors working on their own (Anderson & Tushman, 1990). However, in most other
cases, such a tight coupling is questionable. For example, Aldrich suggests that the work on institu-
tional entrepreneurship conceptualizes “a world designed by farsighted and clever humans that is as
implausible as it is attractive” (2010, p. 349). This implies a greater recognition of the complexity and
uncertainty facing entrepreneurs. By advocating a similar position, but by differentiating between
unique market formation conditions, our framework approaches the efficacy of market formation
actions as an open question rather than a foregone conclusion. Our framework suggests that a more
accurate understanding of market formation will emerge from efforts to consider timing, pacing, and
duration in models of market formation (Aldrich, 2010; Fiss, 2007). Thus, while new markets often
exhibit patterns of rapid entry (Klepper, 1996), this generally occurs only once markets have moved to
States 1 or 2. Our focus on market formation conditions like increasing returns to contributions, actor
heterogeneity, and contribution substitutability underscore the importance of such dynamics.
More broadly, our theory contributes to a growing literature at the nexus of collective action and
entrepreneurship. The myth of the lone entrepreneur has been resoundingly debunked. Research that
demonstrates the socially and contextually contingent nature of entrepreneurship continues to accumu-
late (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Tolbert, David, & Sine, 2011). Advocates of such an approach
(Romanelli & Schoonhoven, 2001) define entrepreneurship as “the purposive and collective market
space-creating activities of entrepreneurs and others” (p. 384) and suggest that “only collective action
by entrepreneurs and investors from many organizations can produce the cognitive and sociopolitical
legitimacy that is needed for creation of a viable new market space” (p. 387). Other work has also
called for a “collective action-based orientation to the study of entrepreneurship” (Sine & Lee, 2009, p.
150). Despite these assertions and calls to understand the role of collective action in market formation
and entrepreneurship, there is surprisingly little understanding of when and under what conditions col-
lective action is necessary for market formation. This is problematic because omitting the collective
struggles in the creation of a market from theories about entrepreneurial success in new markets implies
that explanations are based on empirics involving important sample selection bias. We advance knowl-
edge in this domain by identifying important scope conditions regarding the need for collective action.
A focus on the collective nature of market formation efforts has direct implications for research on fac-
tors hindering entrepreneurial opportunity capture in new markets. While this research focuses predomi-
nantly on the role of individual-level biases (Busenitz & Barney, 1997), our framework shows that
actors’ resource allocation decisions are linked to processes at the collective level. Thus, biases about
collective efforts should be included in such studies.
Finally, by establishing a framework detailing when and how collective action is most likely
needed for market formation, we transcend theoretical domains and encourage greater dialogue
across strategic management, entrepreneurship, and organization literatures. For example, while mar-
ket creation is of concern to strategic management scholars, a primary focus on explaining firm-level
value creation has left open questions about how challenges across actors need to be overcome for
that value to be created (see Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Likewise, our framework suggests that fruitful
linkages exist between strategy and entrepreneurship literatures in market creation contexts where
producers need to pursue collective strategies to generate demand (Rinallo & Golfetto, 2006). For
example, our framework may help us better understand under what conditions collective activities to
educate consumers about the new product’s meaning, use, and value (Doganova & Karnøe, 2015)
may be important for new product category emergence.
In summary, future empirical work that attends to the nature of the uncertainties facing entrepre-
neurs, the timing of when actors enter the new market space and what they specifically contribute to
the development of shared market infrastructure, and the specific actions they engage in can test and
262 LEE ET AL.
refine our theoretical claims. We hope that our framework and theory proves useful as scholars seek
to understand these important dynamics.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank Phanish Puranam, Mahka Moeen, Scott Livengood, Jo-Ellen Pozner, Ruthanne
Huising, Robert David, Lisa Cohen, Peter Younkin, and participants at the Australian School of
Business OMT workshop for reading the manuscript and providing helpful comments.
REFERENCES
Abernathy, W., & Clark, M. (1985). Innovation: Mapping the winds of creative destruction. Research Policy, 14(1), 3–22.
Adner, R., & Kapoor, R. (2010). Value creation in innovation ecosystems: How the structure of technological interdependence affects
firm performance in new technology generations. Strategic Management Journal, 31(3), 306–333.
Aldrich, H. (2010). Beam me up, Scott(ie)! Institutional theorists’ struggles with the emergent nature of entrepreneurship. Research in
the Sociology of Work, 21, 329–364.
Aldrich, H., & Fiol, C. M. (1994). Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry creation. Academy of Management Review, 19,
645–670.
Aldrich, H., & Ruef, M. (2006). Organizations Evolving (2nd ed.). London, England: Sage.
Anderson, P., & Tushman, M. (1990). Technological discontinuities and dominant designs: A cyclical model of technological change.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 604–633.
Ansari, S., & Garud, R. (2009). Inter-generational transitions in socio-technical systems: The case of mobile communications.
Research Policy, 38(2), 382–392.
Arrow, K. (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In National Bureau Committee for Economic
Research (Ed.), The rate and direction of inventive activity: Economic and social factors (pp. 609–626). Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Atuahene-Gima, K., & Li, H. (2004). Strategic decision comprehensiveness and new product development outcomes in new technol-
ogy ventures. Academy of Management Journal, 47, 583–597.
Axelrod, R., Mitchell, W., Thomas, R. E., Bennett, D. S., & Bruderer, E. (1995). Coalition formation in standard-setting alliances.
Management Science, 41(9), 1493–1508.
Bateson, P. (1988). The biological evolution of cooperation and trust. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and breaking cooperative
relations (pp. 14–30). Oxford, England: Blackwell.
Bayus, B. L. (1997). Speed-to-market and new product performance trade-offs. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 14(6),
485–497.
Bekkers, R., Duysters, G., & Verspagen, B. (2002). Intellectual property rights, strategic technology agreements and market structure:
The case of GSM. Research Policy, 31(7), 1141–1161.
Benford, R., & Snow, D. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociol-
ogy, 26, 611–639.
Benner, M. J., & Tripsas, M. (2012). The influence of prior industry affiliation on framing in nascent industries: The evolution of dig-
ital cameras. Strategic Management Journal, 33, 277–302.
Bingham, C. B., & Davis, J. P. (2012). Learning sequences: Their existence, effect, and evolution. Academy of Management Journal,
55(3), 611–641.
Boudreau, K. J., & Lakhani, K. R. (2011). The confederacy of heterogeneous software organizations and heterogeneous developers:
field experimental evidence on sorting and worker effort. In J. Lerner & S. Stern (Eds.), The rate and direction of inventive activ-
ity revisited (pp. 483–502). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Brandenburger, A. M. (1993). Bitter competition: the Holland sweetener company versus Nutrasweet (Harvard Business School Case
No. 9-794-079).
Busenitz, L. W., & Barney, J. B. (1997). Differences between entrepreneurs and managers in large organizations: Biases and heuris-
tics in strategic decision-making. Journal of Business Venturing, 12(1), 9–30.
Carroll, G. R., & Swaminathan, A. (2000). Why the microbrewery movement? Organizational dynamics of resource partitioning in
the U.S. brewing industry. American Journal of Sociology, 106, 715–762.
Cusumano, M. A. (2005). Google: What it is and what it is not. Communications of the ACM, 48(2), 15–17.
Cusumano, M. A., Mylonadis, Y., & Rosenbloom, R. S. (1992). Strategic maneuvering and mass-market dynamics: The triumph of
VHS over Beta. The Business History Review, 66(1), 51–94.
David, P. A., & Greenstein, S. (1990). The economics of compatibility standards: An introduction to recent research. Economics of
Innovation and New Technology, 1, 3–42.
David, R. J., Sine, W. D., & Haveman, H. A. (2013). Seizing opportunity in emerging fields: How institutional entrepreneurs legiti-
mated the professional form of management consulting. Organization Science, 24, 356–377.
LEE ET AL. 263
Davis, G. F., & McAdam, D. (2000). Corporations, classes, and social movements after managerialism. Research in Organizational
Behavior, 22, 193–236.
Davis, J. P. (2016). The group dynamics of interorganizational relationships: Collaborating with multiple partners in innovation eco-
systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 61, 621–661.
DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.), Institutional patterns and organizations:
Culture and environment (pp. 3–21). Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Dixit, A., & Pindyck, R. (1994). Investment under uncertainty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Doganova, L., & Karnøe, P. (2015). Building markets for clean technologies: Controversies, environmental concerns and economic
worth. Industrial Marketing Management, 44, 22–31.
Edelman, B., Jaffe, S., & Kominers, S. D. (2016). To Groupon or not to Groupon: The profitability of deep discounts. Marketing
Letters, 27(1), 39–53.
Eggers, J. P., & Kaplan, S. (2009). Cognition and renewal: Comparing CEO and organizational effects on incumbent adaptation to
technical change. Organization Science, 20(2), 461–477.
Etzion, D., & Struben, J. (2015). Better place: shifting paradigms in the automotive industry. In M. Pirson (Ed.), Case studies in
social entrepreneurship The Oikos Collection, Vol. 4. Sheffield, England: Greenleaf; Chapter 8.
Farrell, J., & Klemperer, P. (2007). Coordination and lock-in: Competition with switching costs and network effects. In
M. Armstrong & R. Porter (Eds.), Handbook of industrial organization (Vol. 3, pp. 1967–2072). Amsterdam, Netherlands:
Elsevier.
Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1986). Installed base and compatibility: Innovation, product preannouncements, and predation. The Ameri-
can Economic Review, 76(5), 940–955.
Farrell, J., & Saloner, G. (1988). Coordination through committees and markets. RAND Journal of Economics, 19(2), 235–252.
Fauchart, E., & Gruber, M. (2011). Darwinians, communitarians, and missionaries: The role of founder identity in entrepreneurship.
Academy of Management Journal, 54(5), 935–957.
Fiss, P. C. (2007). A set-theoretic approach to organizational configurations. Academy of Management Review, 32, 1180–1198.
Fleming, L. (2001). Recombinant uncertainty in technological search. Management Science, 47(1), 117–132.
Fligstein, N. (2001). The architecture of markets: An economic sociology of capitalist societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Fligstein, N., & Dauter, L. (2007). The sociology of markets. Annual Review of Sociology, 33, 105–128.
Flynn, P. (2002). Commercializing an alternate vehicle fuel: Lessons learned from natural gas for vehicles. Energy Policy, 30,
613–619.
Forbes, D. P., & Kirsch, D. A. (2011). The study of emerging industries: Recognizing and responding to some central problems.
Journal of Business Venturing, 26, 589–602.
Garud, R., Jain, S., & Kumaraswamy, A. (2002). Institutional entrepreneurship in the sponsorship of common technological stan-
dards: The case of Sun Microsystems and Java. Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), 196–214.
Garud, R., & Karnøe, P. (2003). Bricolage versus breakthrough: Distributed and embedded agency in technology entrepreneurship.
Research Policy, 32, 277–300.
Gould, R. V. (1991). Multiple networks and mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871. American Sociological Review, 56(6),
6716–6729.
Granovetter, M. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal of Sociology, 83(6), 1420–1443.
Grodal, S., Gotsopoulos, A., & Suarez, F. F. (2015). The coevolution of technologies and categories during industry emergence.
Academy of Management Review, 40(3), 423–445.
Guérard, S., Bode, C., & Gustafsson, R. (2013). Turning point mechanisms in a dualistic process model of institutional emergence:
The case of the diesel particulate filter in Germany. Organization Studies, 34(5–6), 781–822.
Gulati, R., Lawrence, P., & Puranam, P. (2005). Adaptation in vertical relationships: Beyond incentive conflict. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, 26(5), 415–440.
Gurses, K., & Ozcan, P. (2015). Entrepreneurship in regulated markets: Framing contests and collective action to introduce pay TV in
the US. Academy of Management Journal, 58(6), 1709–1739.
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1989). Organizational ecology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248.
Hargadon, A., & Douglas, Y. (2001). When innovations meet institutions: Edison and the design of the electric light. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 46, 476–501.
Heckathorn, D. D. (1996). The dynamics and dilemmas of collective action. American Sociological Review, 61(2), 250–277.
Hiatt, S. R., Sine, W. D., & Tolbert, P. S. (2009). From Pabst to Pepsi: The deinstitutionalization of social practices and the creation
of entrepreneurial opportunities. Administrative Science Quarterly, 54(4), 635–667.
Huang, L., Menon, A., & Zuzul, T. (2016). Mental model change and entrepreneurial entry: The case of New Space (Working
Paper).
Ingram, P., & Yue, L. Q. (2008). Structure, affect and identity as bases of organizational competition and cooperation. Academy of
Management Annals, 2(1), 275–303.
Kaplan, S., & Tripsas, M. (2008). Thinking about technology: Applying a cognitive lens to technical change. Research Policy, 37(5),
790–805.
264 LEE ET AL.
Katz, M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1994). Systems competition and network effects. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(2), 93–115.
Kennedy, M. T. (2008). Getting counted: Markets, media and reality. American Sociological Review, 73, 270–295.
Kennedy, M. T., & Fiss, P. C. (2013). An ontological turn in categories research: From standards of legitimacy to evidence of actual-
ity. Journal of Management Studies, 50, 1138–1154.
Khaire, M., & Wadhwani, R. D. (2010). Changing landscapes: The construction of meaning and value in a new market category—
Modern Indian art. Academy of Management Journal, 53(6), 1281–1304.
Kirzner, I. M. (1973). Competition and entrepreneurship. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Klepper, S. (1996). Entry, exit, growth, and innovation over the product life cycle. The American Economic Review, 86(3), 562–583.
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty, and profit. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Leblebici, H., Salancik, G., Copay, A., & King, T. (1991). Institutional change and the transformation of interorganizational fields:
An organizational history of the US radio broadcasting industry. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(3), 333–363.
Lee, B. (2009). The infrastructure of collective action and policy content diffusion in the organic food industry. Academy of Manage-
ment Journal, 52(6), 1247–1269.
Lee, B., Hiatt, S., & Lounsbury, M. (2017). Market mediators and the trade-offs of legitimacy-seeking behaviors in a nascent cate-
gory. Organization Science, 28(3), 447–470.
Lenox, M. (2006). The role of private decentralized institutions in sustaining industry self-regulation. Organization Science, 17(6),
677–690.
Lounsbury, M., & Glynn, M. A. (2001). Cultural entrepreneurship: Stories, legitimacy, and the acquisition of resources. Strategic
Management Journal, 22, 545–564.
Lounsbury, M., Ventresca, M., & Hirsch, P. (2003). Social movements, field frames and industry emergence: A cultural-political per-
spective on U.S. recycling. Socio-Economic Review, 1, 71–104.
Markides, C., & Geroski, P. A. (2005). Fast second: how smart companies bypass radical innovation to enter and dominate new
markets. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Marwell, G., & Oliver, P. (1993). The critical mass in collective action: A micro-social theory. New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
McGrath, R. G. (1997). A real options logic for initiating technology positioning investments. Academy of Management Review, 22,
974–996.
McKendrick, D., & Carroll, G. (2001). On the genesis of organizational forms: Evidence from the market for disk arrays. Organiza-
tion Science, 12, 661–682.
Moeen, M., & Agarwal, R. (2017). Incubation of an industry: Heterogenous knowledge bases and modes of value capture. Strategic
Management Journal, 38(3), 566–587.
Monge, P. R., Fulk, J., Kalman, M. E., Flanagin, A. J., Parnass, C., & Rumsey, S. (1998). Production of collective action in alliance-
based interorganizational communication and information systems. Organization Science, 9(3), 411–433.
Montgomery, A. W., Dacin, P. A., & Dacin, M. T. (2012). Collective social entrepreneurship: Collaboratively shaping social good.
Journal of Business Ethics, 111(3), 375–388.
Navis, C., & Glynn, M. A. (2010). How new market categories emerge: Temporal dynamics of legitimacy, identity, and entrepreneur-
ship in satellite radio, 1990–2005. Administrative Science Quarterly, 55, 439–471.
New York Times. (2016, May 5). F.D.A. imposes rules for e-cigarettes in a landmark move. New York Times. Retrieved from http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/science/fda-rules-electronic-cigarettes.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share
Noel, J. K., Rees, V. W., & Connolly, G. N. (2011). Electronic cigarettes: A new “tobacco” industry? Tobacco Control, 20(1), 81–81.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Ozcan, P., & Santos, F. M. (2015). The market that never was: Turf wars and failed alliances in mobile payments. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, 36(10), 1486–1512.
Pacheco, D. F., York, J. G., & Hargrave, T. J. (2014). The coevolution of industries, social movements, and institutions: Wind power
in the United States. Organization Science, 25, 1609–1632.
Raff, D. M. (2000). Superstores and the evolution of firm capabilities in American bookselling. Strategic Management Journal,
21(10/11), 1043–1060.
Rao, H. (1994). The social construction of reputation-certification contests, legitimation, and the survival of organizations in the
American automobile industry: 1895–1912. Strategic Management Journal, 15(1), 29–44.
Rao, H., & Giorgi, S. (2006). Code breaking: How entrepreneurs exploit cultural logics to generate institutional change. Research in
Organizational Behavior, 27, 269–304.
Rao, H., Monin, P., & Durand, R. (2003). Institutional change in toque ville: Nouvelle cuisine as an identity movement in French gas-
tronomy. American Journal of Sociology, 108(4), 795–843.
Rao, H., Morrill, C., & Zald, M. N. (2000). Power plays: Social movements, collective action and new organizational forms. Research
in Organizational Behavior, 22, 239–282.
Rinallo, D., & Golfetto, F. (2006). Representing markets: The shaping of fashion trends by French and Italian fabric companies.
Industrial Marketing Management, 35(7), 856–869.
LEE ET AL. 265
Rohlfs, J. (2001). Bandwagon effects in high-technology industries. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Romanelli, E., & Schoonhoven, C. (2001). The local origins of organizational foundings. In C. B. Schoonhoven & E. Romanelli
(Eds.), The entrepreneurship dynamic: Origins of entrepreneurship and the evolution of industries (pp. 40–67). Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Rosa, J., Porac, J., Runser-Spanjol, J., & Saxon, M. (1999). Sociocognitive dynamics in a product market. Journal of Marketing, 63, 64–77.
Santos, F., & Eisenhardt, K. (2009). Constructing markets and shaping boundaries: Entrepreneurial power in nascent fields. Academy
of Management Journal, 52, 643–671.
Schneiberg, M., & Bartley, T. (2001). Regulating American industries: Markets, politics, and the institutional determinants of fire
insurance regulation. American Journal of Sociology, 107, 101–146.
Schneiberg, M., & Berk, G. (2010). From categorical imperative to learning by categories: cost accounting and new categorical prac-
tices in American manufacturing, 1900–1930. In G. Hsu (Ed.), Categories in markets: Origins and evolution (pp. 255–292).
Bingley, England: Emerald Group.
Shane, S., & Stuart, T. (2002). Organizational endowments and the performance of university start-ups. Management Science, 48,
154–170.
Simcoe, T. (2012). Standard setting committees: Consensus governance for shared technology platforms. American Economic Review,
102(1), 305–336.
Sine, W. D., Haveman, H., & Tolbert, P. (2005). Risky business? Entrepreneurship in the new independent-power sector. Administra-
tive Science Quarterly, 50, 200–232.
Sine, W. D., & Lee, B. H. (2009). Tilting at windmills? The environmental movement and the emergence of the U.S. wind energy
sector. Administrative Science Quarterly, 54(1), 123–155.
Sloane, P. (2012, May 5). A lesson in innovation–why did the Segway fail? Innovation Management. Retrieved from http://www.
innovationmanagement.se/2012/05/02/a-lesson-in-innovation-why-did-the-segway-fail/
Sperling, D. (1988). New transportation fuels: A strategic approach to technological change. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
Sperling, D., & Gordon, D. (2009). Two billion cars: Driving toward sustainability. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Strang, D., & Soule, S. A. (1998). Diffusion in organizations and social movements: From hybrid corn to poison pills. Annual Review
of Sociology, 24, 265–290.
Teece, D. J. (1986). Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy.
Research Policy, 15(6), 285–305.
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7),
509–533.
Tolbert, P., David, R., & Sine, W. (2011). Studying choice and change: The intersection of institutional theory and entrepreneurship
research. Organization Science, 22, 1332–1344.
Tripsas, M. (2008). Customer preference discontinuities: A trigger for radical technological change. Managerial and Decision Eco-
nomics, 29(2–3), 79–97.
Van de Ven, A. H. (1993). The emergence of an industrial infrastructure for technological innovation. Journal of Comparative Eco-
nomics, 17, 338–365.
Van de Ven, A. H., & Garud, R. (1993). Innovation and industry development: The case of cochlear implants. In R. Rosenbloom & R.
Burgelman (Eds.), Research in technological innovation, management and policy (Vol. 5, pp. 1–46). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Von Krogh, G., Spaeth, S., & Lakhani, K. R. (2003). Community, joining, and specialization in open source software innovation: A
case study. Research Policy, 32(7), 1217–1241.
Weber, K., Heinze, K. L., & DeSoucey, M. (2008). Forage for thought: Mobilizing codes in the movement for grass-fed meat and
dairy products. Administrative Science Quarterly, 53, 529–567.
Wernerfelt, B., & Karnani, A. (1987). Competitive strategy under uncertainty. Strategic Management Journal, 8(2), 187–194.
White, H. C. (1981). Where do markets come from? American Journal of Sociology, 87, 983–1038.
Whittington, K. B., Owen-Smith, J., & Powell, W. W. (2009). Networks, propinquity, and innovation in knowledge-intensive indus-
tries. Administrative Science Quarterly, 54(1), 90–122.
Wijen, F., & Ansari, S. (2007). Overcoming inaction through collective institutional entrepreneurship: Insights from regime theory.
Organization Studies, 28(7), 1079–1100.
York, J. G., & Lenox, M. J. (2014). Exploring the sociocultural determinants of de novo versus de alio entry in emerging industries.
Strategic Management Journal, 35(13), 1930–1951.
Zhu, S. H., Sun, J. Y., Bonnevie, E., Cummins, S. E., Gamst, A., Yin, L., & Lee, M. (2014). Four hundred and sixty brands of e-
cigarettes and counting: Implications for product regulation. Tobacco Control, 23(suppl 3), iii3–iii9.
How to cite this article: Lee BH, Struben J, Bingham CB. Collective action and market for-
mation: An integrative framework. Strat Mgmt J. 2018;39:242–266. https://doi.org/10.1002/
smj.2694
266 LEE ET AL.
